DAVIS V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENSURE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE ADVANTAGE

W. Clayton Landa*
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the passage of the landmark amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act ("FECA") in 1974, Congress and the courts
have grappled with the role money can and should play in politics and
the electoral process. 1 On one side stands Congress, attempting to
regulate campaign contributions from donors and spending by candidates
in an effort to lower the cost of campaigning, reduce the influence of
wealthy special interests to limit alleged corruption, open up the
2
political process to change, and promote a brand of political equality.
On the other side stands the Supreme Court of the United States,
engaging in a balancing act to protect core First Amendment political
speech through campaign expenditures and contributions, while allowing
Congress to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption.3
While the major debate usually centers on campaign contributions and
expenditures by individuals, corporations, or other organizations, a new
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1. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1067 (2008) (noting Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning campaign finance law has swung like a pendulum, with periods of court deference to
Congressional regulation alternating with a more skeptical view that the First Amendment bars much
campaign finance regulation).
2. Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049-50 (1996).
3. See Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social Inequality Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 955, 967-68 (2004) (describing the Supreme Court's evolution of the definition of corruption
and its practice of allowing Congress to combat corruption from the earliest case of Buckley v. Valeo
through McConnell v. FEC, while still adhering to strict scrutiny when considering any regulations of
money as political speech protected by the First Amendment).
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attempt to solve an old dilemma of the wealthy, self-financed candidate
recently reached the Supreme Court in Davis v. Federal Election
Commission.4
The Supreme Court is set to determine if the
"Millionaires' Amendment" to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 ("BCRA") violates the First Amendment by chilling the free
speech of a self-financed candidate. 5 Opponents of the amendment
argue allowing an adversary of a self-financed candidate to raise
campaign funds in excess of normal statutory limits and allowing
increased coordinated expenditures from a political party burdens free
speech rights because such an advantage discourages a candidate from
self-financing his campaign. 6 Congress first addressed the problem of
wealthy self-financed candidates in the 1974 FECA amendments by
limiting expenditure amounts for self-financed candidates. 7 In the
landmark campaign finance decision Buckley v. Valeo,8 the Supreme
Court struck down such direct expenditure limits as violating the First
Amendment's right to freedom of speech. 9 Almost three decades after
this decision, Congress passed the Millionaires' Amendment as a way to
address the problem of wealthy self-financed candidates without running
afoul of the First Amendment and Buckley. 10
Davis has raised numerous campaign finance issues: the precise
definition of corruption in the electoral process; whether the
government has an important interest in leveling the playing field of
campaign finance to battle the perception that money can buy a seat in
Congress; whether variations in contribution limits actually chill
political speech by discouraging a candidate from self-financing; and,
even if it does, whether the government interest is sufficient to allow
raised limits.
Part II of this note explores the history of campaign
finance regulation through Congress and the courts, specifically focusing
on self-financed candidates and the consideration of expenditure and
contribution limits through the lens of the First Amendment. Part III
will detail the background to Davis and analyze the District Court of the
4. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008); see Richard Wolf Hess, No Fair Play for Millionaires?
McCain-Feingold's Wealthy Candidate Restrictions and the First Amendment, 70 U. CHL L. REV.
1067, 1067 (2003).
5. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 319, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1 (Supp. V 2005); Davis, 128
S.Ct. at 976.
6. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1; Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 976.
7. See Hess, supra note 4, at 1067.
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. Id. at 39-59.
10. Jennifer A. Steen, The Millionaires'Amendment, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN

CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 159, 161 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003).
11. See Hess, supranote 4, at 1067-69.
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District of Columbia's decision to uphold the Millionaires' Amendment.
Part IV will then analyze the issues the amendment presents in detail and
provide insight into possible Court rulings and ramifications.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. The FECA and Buckley v. Valeo
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress enacted amendments
to the FECA in 1974, including the first true stringent regulations on the
campaign finance system in elections. 12
The amendments limited
individual, political party, and political action committee ("PAC")
contributions to candidates; personal spending by candidates; campaign
spending for federal offices; and independent spending by groups
unaffiliated with a candidate. 13
In Buckley, the Supreme Court
considered all of these amendments, but of particular importance, the
Court considered individual limits placed on spending and contributions,
as well as implications for protected First Amendment free speech. 14

The Court uniformly struck down any direct limits on a self-financed
candidate's spending of personal funds on his own behalf.1 5 The Court
first noted that money essentially equates to political speech in today's
society and therefore, "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. 1 6 The Court did not rule equality of resources was an
illegitimate government interest, but that equality alone was not
sufficient to impose direct limits on a candidate's personal funding for
his campaign.1 7 As the Court equated personal spending with political
speech, the "ancillary interest" of relative equality of resources could
not justify a direct restriction on the freedom of a candidate's speech. 18

12. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1055.
13. Id. (citing Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263).
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-59 (1976).
15. See id. at 52-54.
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 54.
18. See id.
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The Court also noted that candidate contribution limits, while
implicating First Amendment restrictions on free speech, entail "only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication." 19 As the limits on contributions involve only little
direct restraint on political speech, the Court determined the
government interest in preventing corruption or even the appearance of
corruption was sufficient to uphold the one thousand dollar contribution
limit set by Congress. 20 The existence of actual large donations to
secure quid pro quo arrangements from current and potential elected
officials, as well as the appearance of such possible corruption, justified
Congress in setting the limit it deemed appropriate. 21 Further, the Court
ruled it was for Congress, and not the courts, to determine what limit is
necessary to combat real or perceived corruption and any failure of
22
Congress to adjust the limits does not invalidate the legislation.
In addition to these main findings implicated in Buckley, the Court
also upheld the public financing system set up by the 1974 amendments
and the candidate disclosure requirements. 23
The Court allowed
candidates to receive public financing, which carried raised contribution
limits and expenditure ceilings, 24 but the Court did not find a burden on
the publicly financed candidate's opponent when the choice to receive
funds was voluntary. 2 In addition, the Court held the public financing
system did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause
and "the Constitution does not require Congress to treat all declared
candidates the same for public financing purposes. ' 26 In other words,
the public funding scheme used to determine if a presidential candidate
could receive public funding and the effect or disadvantage such funding
27
may have on the opponent was not an equal protection violation.

19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at20-21.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 109.
24. Id. at 57 n.65 (noting that Congress may provide for public financing and condition acceptance of
funds on an agreement to abide by expenditure limits).
25. Id. ("Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he
may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding.").
26. Id. at 97.
27. See id.
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B. The BCRA, McConnell, and Other Cases
In 2002, the BCRA went into effect to address numerous loopholes
and inconsistencies that emerged since the FECA in 1974 and the
varying decisions of the Supreme Court. 28 While the BCRA mainly
focused on the use of so-called soft money in elections, Congress again
attempted to address what in the sponsors' minds was "the public
perception that there is something inherently corrupt about a wealthy
candidate who can use a substantial amount of his or her personal
resources to win an election. ' 29 The law set out a scheme allowing an
opponent of a self-financed candidate who has spent more than three
hundred and fifty thousand dollars to calculate the opposition personal
funds amount ("OPFA") in order to determine if he is eligible for relaxed
contribution limits and other measures. 30 If eligible, the opponent may
receive individual contributions at three times the normal limit, receive
contributions from individuals who have met their aggregate limit for
contributions, and coordinate with his political party on otherwise
limited party expenditures.31 The amendment also requires a candidate
planning to self-finance his campaign to declare the amount of personal
funds over three hundred and fifty thousand dollars he plans to spend
within fifteen days of declaring his candidacy. 3 2 In addition, when the
candidate exceeds the three hundred and fifty thousand dollar threshold,
he must notify the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") within
twenty-four hours and must report each additional personal fund
expenditure of ten thousand dollars or more.3 3 Finally, the self-financed
candidate's opponent using the raised contribution limits and
coordinated party expenditures must report to the FEC and his party
within twenty-four hours of receiving contributions equal to one hundred
34
percent of the OPFA.

28. See Kurt Hohenstein, "Clio, Meet Buckley - Buckley, Clio": Re-Introducing History to Unravel
the Tangle of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 ALB. GOv'T L. REv. 63, 89-92 (2008).

29. Hess, supranote 4, at 1074 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S2535 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of
Senator Dewine)).
30. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-l(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005). The candidate must determine the amount of funds spent
by each candidate, add fifty percent of the total funds raised by each candidate during the year prior
to the election, and compare the totals. Id. § 441a-l(a)(2). If the opponent's OPFA is below the selffinanced candidate, he may take advantage of the higher limits until the amounts are equal under the
OPFA formula. Id.
31. Id. § 441a-l(a)(1)(A)-(C).
32. Id. § 441a-l(b)(1)(B).
33. Id. § 441a-l(b)(1)(C)-(D).
34. Id.

82

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. 12:77

The BCRA, including the Millionaires' Amendment, was challenged
almost immediately and substantially upheld by the Supreme Court in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.35 The Court again focused
on corruption as the main justification for statutory provisions placing a
burden on the First Amendment's freedom of speech. 36 The Court
notably deferred to Congress to determine the appropriate level of
limits. 37 Concerning the Millionaires' Amendment, the Court dismissed
the complaint, stating the plaintiffs "fail[ed] to allege a cognizable
injury that [was] 'fairly traceable' to the BCRA. '38
The Court
considered the plaintiffs' arguments that the raised limits affected a
"curtailment of the scope of their participation in the electoral process"
without merit. 39 Further, the Court noted "political 'free trade' does
not necessarily require that all who participate in the political
marketplace do so with exactly equal resources" 40 and the "alleged
inability to compete stem[med from the plaintiffs'] own personal 'wish'
'41
not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e., their personal choice.
Finally, of particular importance to Davis, the Court also upheld strict
twenty-four hour disclosure and reporting requirements for specific large
42
expenditures, holding they did not prevent anyone from speaking.
Other rulings, while not bearing directly on self-financed candidates,
show a progression from a more deferential Supreme Court to one
reasserting a greater role for the First Amendment. 43 In Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC,44 the Rehnquist Court almost completely
45
deferred to Congress on the matter of appropriate contribution limits.
Even further, the Court held that contribution limits do not merit strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment in the same vein as expenditure
limits. 46 Yet, just six years later, the new Roberts Court, with two new

35. 540 U.S. 93 (2003); see Hohenstein, supranote 28 at 92.
36. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136.
37. See id. at 137.
38. Id. at 230.
39. Id. at227.
40. Id. at 227 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
41. Id. at228.
42. See id. at 201-02 (ruling that a twenty-four reporting requirement for each direct expenditure
totaling more than $10,000, for the purposes of producing and airing electioneering communications,
did not prevent speech).
43. See Hasen, supranote 1 at 1065.
44. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
45. See id. at 389; see also Hasen, supra note 1, at 1069 (noting that with such a deferential tone, "it
was hard to see any contribution limit failing constitutional scrutiny as too low").
46. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 387-88 (noting that contribution limits "require less compelling
justification than restrictions on independent spending").

20081

DAVIS V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

justices, struck down Vermont's state contribution limits as too low to
47
allow for meaningful political speech in Randall v. Sorrell.

In addition, the Court, while adhering to Buckley's anti-corruption
justification, began to espouse slightly broader definitions for corruption
48
when it upheld spending limits for corporations in candidate elections.
The Court noted such corporate independent expenditures may not be a
part of the normal quid pro quo corruption of Buckley. 49 Still, the
statute "aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas. '50 This corruption rationale appeared wholly consistent with
Buckley, which noted "the limitation on the size of outside
contributions, the financial resources available to a candidate... , [and]
the number of volunteers recruited will... vary with the size and intensity
of the candidate's support. ' 51 Therefore, only public support should
serve to limit a candidate in sending his or her message to the public, not
the government. 52
In Austin, the Court essentially ruled that a
corporation did not solicit funds to support its political ideology or for
specific candidate support and the government can restrict such
independent expenditures for express advocacy. 53 Again, in Federal
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 54 without expressly
overturning Austin, the new Roberts Court granted a corporation an
exemption to use treasury funds to pay and run an independent
55
expenditure advertisement, claiming it was not express advocacy.
Davis will be decided in this spectrum of a changing Supreme Court.
As Richard Hasen notes, "the Supreme Court's approach to campaign
finance law has swung like a pendulum" since 1976 with periods of
deference to views that the First Amendment prohibits much campaign

47. 548 U.S. 230, 260-62 (2006).
48. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) (holding that corporations
may not use their treasury funds for direct independent expenditures but must funnel the money
through a separate political action committee).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56 (1976).
52. See id.
53. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
54. 551 U.S.
, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
55. Id. at 2672-73 (2007) (holding the purported interest in combating a different type of corruption
did not need to be considered because the ad in question was not express advocacy).
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finance regulation.5 6 Davis will be decided by a Court where "the
pendulum has swung sharply away from deference toward perhaps the
greatest period of deregulation we will have witnessed since before
Congress passed the important [FECA] Amendments of 1974."57
III.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DECISION

A. Procedural Background
Jack Davis, the plaintiff, ran and lost a self-financed campaign for a
congressional seat as the Democratic nominee in 2004. 5 1 While running
for the same seat in 2006, Davis filed the required Statement of
Candidacy on March 23, 2006 and, under the BCRA, declared his intent
to refrain from spending any personal funds for the primary campaign
and spend only $1,000,000 in personal funds for the November general
election. 59 Davis then filed a facial challenge to the Millionaires'
Amendment in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and both
Davis and the FEC moved for summary judgment. 60 The District Court
determined Davis had standing because the added disclosure requirements
imposed an injury-in-fact that could be traced directly to the
Millionaires' Amendment and removed by a favorable ruling by the
62
court. 61 The court then proceeded on the substantive issues.
B. District of Columbia Decision
The D.C. District Court uniformly dismissed Davis's First
Amendment claims as the BCRA placed no direct burden or limitation
63
on the exercise of his political speech by restricting his expenditures.
The court also dismissed Davis's claim that a benefit conferred on his
opponent to raise additional funds and increase coordinated party
expenditures resulted in a penalty that sufficiently chilled political

56. Hasen, supranote 1, at 1064.
57. Id. at 1065.
58. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 29. The court found the amendment placed no restrictions on a candidate's ability to spend
unlimited amounts of his personal wealth to speak to the voters, nor reduced the amount of money he is
able to raise from contributors under normal limits. Id.
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speech and thereby violated the First Amendment. 64 The court did agree
with Davis's suggestion that a regulatory scheme conferring a
competitive advantage may be so extreme as to work an
"unconstitutional burden on a candidate's First Amendment right to
pursue elective office. '65 However, the court went on to say, "no court
has found such a... burden where the... candidate's choice to fund his
campaign from one of several permissible sources" results in the
66
disadvantage.
The court analogized the advantage of raised contribution limits and
choice to the public financing schemes upheld in Buckley, where the
candidate chose public financing and therefore benefited from public
67
funding but agreed to expenditure limits or restrictions on free speech.
In addition, the court found the Millionaires' Amendment was similar to
other public financing schemes permitting higher contribution limits for
candidates agreeing to public financing and expenditure limits. 68 The
main issue, the court noted, was the level of coercion the advantage
placed on the candidate where a disadvantage may be so onerous that the
candidate essentially feels compelled to forgo one permissible funding
option.

69

In this case, the court determined no such disparities existed and, in
fact, the amendment only allowed the opponent of a self-financed
candidate to level the playing field through increased contribution limits,
without gaining an overall money advantage.70 Further, Davis did not
show his speech was limited in any way, as he chose to spend
$1,000,000 of his own money even after losing the election during his

64. Id. at 30 (ruling that a benefit to one candidate, and therefore a penalty to the other, does not by
itself violate the First Amendment unless the advantage chills a substantial amount of free speech).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 29 (citing Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464-65
(1st Cir. 2000) (upholding statute providing public matching funds to candidates participating in a
public financing scheme); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding statutory
provision waiving expenditure limits when a non-participating opponent raises funds exceeding that
amount); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1551 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding statutory provision
waiving the expenditure limitation when a privately financed opponent's spending exceeds the limit);
Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding statute permitting a limitation
of $1000 on contributions received by non-participating candidates while allowing candidates
accepting public funding to accept $2000 contributions)).
69. Id. at 31 (noting Buckley's reliance on a candidate's choice to forgo private fundraising and
accept public funding did not create a constitutional dilemma, and a constitutional burden exists only
when an advantage creates "a large disparity between benefits and restrictions that candidates are
coerced to publicly finance their campaigns" (quoting Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550)).
70. Id.
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first attempt.

71

The court then determined the additional disclosure requirements
posed no constitutional burden on a self-financed candidate. 72 First, the
court reasoned that Buckley found "no constitutional [burdens] in the
''73
recordkeeping[,] reporting, and disclosure requirements of the FECA.
Second, the Supreme Court had upheld more onerous disclosure
requirements in McConnell by requiring a filing within twenty-four hours
after any person makes a disbursement totaling more than $10,000 for
an electioneering communication. 74 While the requirements may be
75
burdensome, the Supreme Court ruled that they did not inhibit speech.
Therefore, the court determined the strict twenty-four hour timing of
the requirement was no more burdensome than the provisions upheld in
McConnell, and Davis conceded the information would have to be
disclosed even without the amendment. 76
Finally, the reporting
requirements do not apply unilaterally to the self-financed candidate as
the candidate's opponent must also notify the FEC and his political
party within twenty-four hours after determining the self-financed
candidate spent above the threshold. 77 Additionally, the court held the
opponent must notify the FEC and his party within twenty-four hours if
he received increased contributions. 78 The notification requirements
also apply when the candidate receives Millionaires' Amendment
contributions and when he reaches the proportionality cap. 79 Political
parties must also report increased coordinated expenditures within
twenty-four hours. 80
Finally, the court rejected Davis's Fifth Amendment equal protection
claim because Davis did not show the Millionaires' Amendment treated
similarly situated candidates differently. 81 In addition, the Supreme

71. See id. at31-3 2.
72. See id. at 32.
73. Id. at 32 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63, 84 (1976) (noting FECA required records
including the name and address of any contributor making a contribution in excess of $10, in addition
to the date and amount of the contribution, and if the person's contributions aggregate more than $100,
his occupation and place of business, as well as quarterly reports of detailed financial information on
contributors and contributions).
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. at 32 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)).
76. Id. at 32-33.
77. Id. at 33.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 33 (noting self-financed candidates are in a different situation from those who lack the
resources to fund their own campaigns, and it was precisely this difference that spurred Congress to
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Court has long held that the Constitution does not require all declared
candidates to be treated identically for public financing purposes, and
82
such differences do not amount to an equal protection violation.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AMENDMENT, SUPREME COURT CONSIDERATION, AND

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

A. Protected Political Speech and First Amendment Harm.
1. Coercion is Necessary to Substantially Chill Political Speech
In a case claiming a violation of First Amendment freedom of speech,
the Court must first determine if the Millionaires' Amendment actually
"burdens the exercise of political speech and, if it does, whether it is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. ' 83 Political
speech, in the form of expenditures of money, may not be directly
restricted by government as such a restriction violates the First
Amendment's freedom of speech. 84 The Millionaires' Amendment
provides no such direct restriction on any candidate's ability to spend
unlimited amounts of personal funds. 85 Therefore, Davis argues that the
benefit of increased contribution limits works to chill his political speech
by providing a disincentive to using his own personal funds for his
86
campaign and such a disincentive alone violates the First Amendment.
The only alleged harm imposed is a self-financed candidate's knowledge
his spending will provide his opponent with an advantage of raised limits
87
or that the self-financed candidate will enhance his opponent's speech.
The Supreme Court's rulings to date concerning protected political
speech have only addressed direct limits on core political speech through

craft an amendment combating the perception of electoral unfairness in the wealthy being able to buy
seats in Congress).
82. Id. at 33-34.
83. Austin v.Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (citing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976) (per curiam)).
84. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.

85. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 (2007); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Davis v.
FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2008). Chief Justice Roberts categorically stated that wealthy
candidates are not restricted in their personal spending habits, and Davis's counsel agreed. Id.
86. See Brief of Appellant at 42-44, Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008) (noting potential
self-financers either forgo their constitutional right to fund their own campaign or provide their
opponent with financial benefits correlated to their personal expenditures).
87. Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 85, at 4.
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either expenditures or contributions.8 8 In fact, as the district court
noted, there is no precedent that an advantage for one candidate acts
directly as a sufficient burden on the opposing candidate in violation of
the First Amendment.8 9 Davis argues that whether the regulation
imposes an absolute restriction on money spent or creates an
impairment for the candidate's own voluntary choice to spend money is
irrelevant. 90 For support, Davis cites Day v. Holahan,91 where the
Eighth Circuit struck down a provision allowing a publicly funded
candidate to go above voluntary spending limits and receive additional
92
public subsidies in response to an independent expenditure campaign.
What Davis does not mention is that just two years after Day, in
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez,93 the Eighth Circuit upheld a statute allowing a
publicly funded candidate who had previously agreed to expenditure
limits to waive that limit if a non-participating opponent raised or spent
over a threshold amount. 94 In addition, the court found a lack of
coercion or advantage that would chill political speech by allowing a
partial tax break to donors of participating candidates. 95 Specifically,
providing an incentive for public financing, even allowing greater
spending once an opponent spends a specific amount, does not
sufficiently burden the opponent's free speech because the disparities
between the benefit and alleged burden are not so great as to coerce a
candidate into accepting the public financing. 96 Without such coercion,
no First Amendment violation exists. 97 Instead, such a provision
actually enhances the First Amendment by allowing for more political

88. See FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, 557 U.S. _,
127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672-73 (2007); Randall v. Sorell,
548 U.S. 230, 260-62 (2006); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37, 227-30 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink
Mo., 528 U.S. 377, 385-89 (2000); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60
(1990); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
89. See Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (noting a regulatory scheme could exist, creating an extreme
competitive advantage that works as an unconstitutional burden on a candidate's right to pursue
elective office, but no court has found such a burden where the disadvantage is the result of
candidate's choice to fund his campaign from a permissible source).
90. Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Davis v. FEC, No. 07-0320 (U.S. Apr. 11, 2008).
91. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 1360-66 (stating that a targeted candidate would benefit from the knowledge that an
independent group's spending could actually discourage the group from speaking in the first place and
that such self-censorship burdens political speech); Reply Brief of Appellant, supranote 90, at 6; Brief
of Appellant, supranote 86, at 43-44.
93. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).
94. Id. at 1549-52.
95. See id. at 1555.
96. See id. at 1552-53 (noting the voluntary nature of a candidate's funding scheme determination
and the non-participating candidate's control over whether and when the participating opponent will
be freed from limits).
97. See id.
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speech through enhanced expenditures,9 8 a statement agreed upon by the

district court in Davis9 9 and put forth by Chief Justice Roberts
concerning the Millionaires' Amendment.

100

In addition to these findings in Davis, the Supreme Court in Buckley
expressly upheld public financing schemes providing a clear advantage
for public funding. 10 1 The Supreme Court held no First Amendment
violation exists when the government withholds the advantage of public
10 2
funds to a candidate who chooses to make unlimited expenditures.
Under Davis's reasoning, courts could strike down public campaign
financing as a violation of the non-participating candidate's First
Amendment rights, but the Supreme Court has declined to do so. 103
2. Millionaires' Amendment Does Not Appear to Coerce Candidates but
May Self-Chill Speech
A candidate's First Amendment rights are not violated simply because
another candidate benefits, unless the disparity essentially coerces a
candidate into a funding scheme.10 4 In the present case, Davis argues

such coercion is similar to some statutes invalidated by the Supreme
Court. 10 5 These statutes include those requiring a utility company to

10 6
include materials from an opposing consumer group with its bills,

those placing revenues earned from writings of convicted criminals into
escrow, 107 those singling out magazines and newspapers from generally

98. See id. at 1552 (explaining how a scheme that allows for greater spending, in response to nonparticipating candidates' spending, promotes, rather than detracts from, cherished First Amendment
values).
99. See Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22,29 (D.D.C. 2007) (claiming "the Millionaires' Amendment
accomplishes its sponsors' aim to preserve core First Amendment values by protecting the candidate's
ability to enhance his participation in the political marketplace").
100. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 21 (noting "a self-financed candidate isn't
subject to any restriction at all on what he can spend and his opponent is subject to less restrictions. It
seems to me the First Amendment comes out better").
101. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976).
102. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 15, Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2007) (asserting
that the disadvantage of being denied federal funds upheld by Supreme Court is more direct than
injury claimed from Millionaires' Amendment); see also supranote 62.
103. See Hess, supranote 4, at 1087.
104. See Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1552-53 (8th Cir. 1996); Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp.
2d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2002).
105. Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
106. Reply Brief of Appellant, supranote 90, at 6 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of
Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986)).
107. Jurisdictional Statement at 12, Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (Sep. 7, 2008) (citing Simon & Shuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991)).
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applicable gross receipts tax, 10 8 and those taxing paper and ink that only
fell on newspapers. 10 9
Unfortunately, these statutes are inapposite from the statute in Davis

because they impose direct restrictions, requirements, or taxes on
individuals rather than a chilling effect on the choice to do a voluntary
action such as self-finance. 10° Similarly, the Millionaires' Amendment

does not directly tax or interfere with a First Amendment right to make
or spend money, like the other cases cited. 1 The Supreme Court only
invalidated statutes like the one found in found in Simon & Shuster
because they directly restricted speech's content by burdening the direct
income from such speech.11 2 The Millionaires' Amendment provides no

such direct restriction.

3

Conversely, candidates who spend just near the threshold or just above
may choose to regulate their own spending to ensure they do not trigger

the increased amounts.1 1 4 Even these self-financed candidates, but more
specifically the majority of self-financed candidates who spend much

more than the trigger, still get a return for the use of their personal
funds through their political speech. 5 Even if spending meets the
threshold, the amendment itself does not allow any unequal advantage as

the opponent of a self-financing candidate cannot raise funds over the
OPFA formula or, in the words of the courts, to such a level creating a
large disparity.11 6 Therefore, the Supreme Court likely will not conclude
that the Millionaires' Amendment violates the First Amendment by
coercing the candidate into seeking and receiving contributions, rather

108. Id. at 12-13 (citing Ark. Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,234 (1987)).
109. Id. at 13 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593
(1983)).
110. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 26. General Clement noted the Millionaires'
Amendment does not require a self-financed candidate to carry his opponent's speech as in Pacific
Gas. Id.
111. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1, with supra notes 96-98.
112. See Crandall Close, Speech and Subsidies: How Government Uses Financial Threats and
Incentives to Dampen First Amendment Protections, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 285, 289-90
(2008).
113. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29; see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 3-4.
Chief Justice Roberts categorically stated, "there is no restriction whatsoever on [a] wealth[y]
candidate. He can spend as much of his money as he wants," to which Davis's counsel agreed. Id.
114. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 85, at 6.
115. See Steen, supra note 10, at 171. Steen's research found there were relatively few selffinancing congressional candidates in 2000 that spent just above the trigger amounts. Id. The majority
of candidates who spend over the threshold did so by wide margins and, based on their amounts spent,
would be unlikely to restrict their spending to avoid the trigger amounts. Id. at 171-72.
116. See Hess, supranote 4, at 1090 (noting the provision only benefits the opponent to the level of the
self-financed candidate and not beyond).
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than spending his personal funds.
The current Roberts Court has moved away from the Rehnquist Court
that deferred to Congress and past precedent on First Amendment
issues.1 17 Prior to Randall, the Court showed great deference in Austin
and Shrink Missouri where the deferential standard allowed the legislature
great leeway to determine appropriate expenditure restrictions on
corporations and contribution limits. 118 The Court under Chief Justice
Roberts-and joined by Justice Alito-showed less deference when
striking down Vermont's contribution limits as too low. 119 Subsequently,
the Roberts Court moved even closer toward "the First Amendment
deregulatory position" rather than allowing the legislature to define
corruption, a move appearing to lower the bar for finding First
Amendment harm.1 20 If these trends continue, Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Kennedy appear poised to find a First Amendment harm from the
Millionaires' Amendment.1 21 Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer likely will continue choosing deference to the legislature for
setting contribution limits as it sees fit so long as it allows greater, rather
than lower, limits. 122 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito likely will
form the controlling bloc and find even contribution limits produce First
123
Amendment harms.
If the Supreme Court finds a First Amendment violation, the limited
chill on the choice not to enhance an opponent's speech likely will be
justified through a determination that the government has no legitimate
interest in raising contribution limits or coordinated party expenditures
in the face of a self-financed candidate.
B. Government Interest
In Buckley, the Supreme Court ruled that equalizing resources between
candidates was not a sufficient government interest to justify

117. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 1065 (stating the Supreme Court has moved away from the
deference shown under Rehnquist towards perhaps the greatest period of deregulation witnessed since
before Congress passed FECA amendments in 1974).
118. Id. at 1070-71.
119. Id. at 1071-72.
120. See id. at 1072.
121. Cf id. at 1079 (finding Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas would have overturned Austin and

McConnell and both unions and corporations should be able to pay for electioneering communications
from whatever source they choose).
122. Cf id. at 1071-72 (noting the Court was split in Randall with Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg upholding the limits while Justice Breyer found them too low).
123. See id. at 1104.
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infringement upon core political speech through set limits on personal
fund expenditures. 124 The Supreme Court has never ruled, however, that
equality of core protected political speech is not a valid government
interest, but simply that equality was not sufficient to directly limit the
amount of personal funds a candidate may spend. 125 If the Supreme
Court finds the Millionaires' Amendment does infringe upon core
political speech, the Court must then consider if the harm is sufficient
and narrowly tailored to achieve a valid government interest.1 26 As
contribution limits only marginally affect political speech, they receive
less exacting review than strict scrutiny.1 27 Therefore, the Court has
held combating corruption or even the appearance of corruption is a
valid government interest to set contribution limits. 1 28 Further, courts
have upheld public funding schemes providing a benefit to a candidate, as
they pose little to no constitutional harm, but even if they did, the harm
1 29
is justified by the government interest in combating corruption.
In the present case, the government asserts numerous interests in
enhancing the political speech of a self-financed candidate's opponent
who spends vast amounts of his personal wealth. 13 0 The government is
most concerned that the disparity of campaign resources will make it
more difficult for non-wealthy candidates to compete and put their
message out to the public, the competitive advantage creates the public
perception that someone with enough money can buy a seat in Congress,
and political parties increasingly only recruit independently wealthy
1 31
candidates for office.
These interests of leveling the playing field and fighting the
perception that Congress is for sale do not fit into the traditional anticorruption rationale upheld by the Court.1 32 Nonetheless, the Court has
prevented a "different type of corruption in the political arena: the

124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976).
125. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, supranote 102, at 17.
126. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
127. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-29.
128. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-29.
129. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, supra note 102, at 15 (asserting the disadvantage of being
denied federal funds, which has been upheld by the Supreme Court, is much more direct than the
injury claimed from the Millionaires' Amendment); see also supranote 62.
130. Brief of Appellee at 6, Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2008).
131. Id.; see also Steen, supra note 10, at 170-71 (finding that self-financing has had a chilling effect
on candidate emergence as potential candidates find costs too high when facing a wealthy selffinancer).
132. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 28 (Justice Scalia pointed out the only
campaign finance regimes approved to date by the Supreme Court have used an anti-corruption
rationale).
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corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas. ' 133
While speaking the language of corruption, the Court
embraced the equality rationale that was originally rejected in Buckley,
at least as applied to a corporation. 134 Although the Court allowed an
applied expenditure in Wisconsin Right to Life, originally prohibited in
135
Austin, the Court did not reject this rationale.
Further, the Millionaires' Amendment combats a form of corruption
similar to the one cited in Austin, or rather the corrosive effects of
immense wealth accumulated by an individual and having no correlation
to the candidate's actual public support.1 36 In Buckley, the Supreme
Court noted that the normal relationship between the resources of a
candidate due to the public's support "may not apply where the
candidate devotes a large amount of his personal resources to his
campaign." 137 There is no discernible difference between a candidate
who achieves his campaign funds from personal wealth, as opposed to
the public's support, and the corruption detailed in Austin. 138 As the
Court typically defers to Congress concerning the appropriate level of
contribution limits to battle corruption, unless they are too low, the
courts should also defer to Congress to define corruption as including the
139
effects of massive amounts of wealth not tied to public support.
Otherwise, the Court risks dictating that Congress has no position to
ensure those without money have a loud enough voice to be heard in the
electoral process by protecting them from wealthy candidates who can
140
effectively drown out others' speech.
It is unclear exactly how the controlling bloc of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito will decide the government interest in view of the
slight, indirect, possible First Amendment harm.1 41
Justice Alito's

133. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
134. Hasen, supranote 1, at 1070.
135. See FEC v. Wise. Right to Life, 551 U.S. _,

127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672-73 (2007).

136. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; Hess, supranote 4, at 1089 (noting the amendment reduces precisely
the type of corruption that voters fear most: that money matters more than ideas in elections).
137. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, supranote 102, at 16 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56
n.63 (1975)).
138. See id.
139. See Dotan,supra note 3,at997 (noting courts should only intervene toensure the political
arena
stays open for competition and allowing only the wealthy to use their
money toforestall
or inhibit
democratic process will block democracy).
140. See id. at 988.
141. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85.
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questions during oral arguments appear to indicate that the
government's interests may be stronger when currently allowable
contribution limits are the main factor hindering the opponent of a selffinanced candidate, but these questions do not indicate that the interest
by itself is compelling or permissible. 142 Further, Chief Justice Roberts
indicated the relaxing of contribution restrictions on a candidate eases
any constitutional issues for that candidate so the law may actually be
less violative of the First Amendment.1 43 If the Supreme Court does
find the slight harm to the First Amendment is enough to warrant
scrutiny, it may be severely split on the government interest put forth
to justify that harm.1 44 The Supreme Court may allow the increased
1 45
contribution limits because they enhance political speech overall.
C. Disclosure Requirements
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld disclosure requirements to
further a valid government interest.1 46 Therefore, Davis must show the
disclosure requirements for a self-financed candidate further no
legitimate government interest or were burdensome by divulging
protected speech in the form of campaign spending strategy.1 47 If the
government interests put forth in the preceding subsection are not
considered sufficient, then the Court may strike down the disclosure
requirements as not furthering a valid government interest.
While the requirements may be burdensome by requiring reporting
within twenty-four hours of exceeding the threshold and with every
subsequent $10,000, such a burden alone has never resulted in a First
Amendment violation of other the FECA requirements.1 48 In addition,
the Supreme Court only previously discussed the possible burden in terms
of its effect on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment.1 49 Further, in McConnell, the Court has allowed similar
twenty-four hour reporting requirements concerning electioneering
communications to ensure prompt and timely information to voters.150
While a self-financed candidate does not divulge contributors, the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 14-15.
See id. at 20.
See id. at 20-21.
See id. at 20.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63, 84 (1976).
See Brief of Appellant, supranote 86, at 37-38.
See Brief of Appellee, supranote 130, at 46-47.
See id. at 47.
Id. at 52 (citing McConnell,540 U.S. at 200).
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information is necessary to inform the public of the campaign money's
source is coming from and to ensure the statute operates
appropriately.15 1
During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts remarked that the
differential reporting requirements and strict timelines were problematic,
without discussing any of the associated burdens previously put forth by
the Court.1 52 Again, it is unclear based on prior case law exactly how the
justices will decide the added disclosure requirements. The decision for
this element may very well rely upon whether the Court determines that
raised contribution limits do not violate the self-financed candidate's
free speech. Even if the statute slightly chills the opponent's speech,
but the government interest in leveling the playing field to combat the
corrosive effects of money is sufficient, the disclosure requirements will
1 53
likely be upheld as necessary to the operation of the statute.
D. Equal Protection Violation
A successful equal protection argument must show that the
Millionaires'
Amendment treats similarly situated candidates
differently. 1 54 Davis argues the self-financed candidate and his opponent
are similarly situated, regardless of the differences in funding sources,
simply because they are both candidates for the same congressional
seat.1 55
Therefore, the statute treats the self-financed candidate
spending a specific amount of money differently than his opponent
because different sets of contribution limits apply if both candidates
solicited funds.1 56 In addition, the self-financed candidate's opponent
may benefit from increased coordinated party expenditures.1 57 These
differences occur only because the self-financed candidate exercises his
fundamental right to expend his own personal funds on his behalf as
1 58
core, protected, political speech.

151. Id. at 48 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67) (The information "provides the electorate with
information 'as to where political campaign money comes from' in order to aid the voters in
evaluating those who seek federal office") (internal citations omitted).
152. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 34-35.
153. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196 (agreeing with the Buckley Court that gathering necessary data
to uphold more substantive electioneering provisions is an important government interest).
154. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 33 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182,
200 (1981)).
155. Brief of Appellant, supranote 86, at 57.
156. Id. at 58-59.
157. Id. at 59.
158. Id.
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The fact that both parties are candidates by itself is insufficient to
show the parties are similarly situated and subject to an equal protection
violation. 15 9
In Buckley, the Supreme Court expressly found the
Constitution does not require all candidates receive identical treatment
for public financing purposes, which was a legitimate government
interest. 160 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted Congress was justified
in providing major political parties with full public funding and other
parties with only a percentage of the major party funding because the
parties themselves were differentiated by their ability to raise and spend
money.1 61
Further, the Court found no evidence the differential
treatment disadvantaged the appellants by reducing their strength below
what they would have attained under full public financing.1 62 For this
finding, the Court specifically relied on the fact the parties are free to
raise money from whatever sources they choose and are free to spend as
1 63
much as they desire.
Under this equal protection analysis, Congress appears justified to
164
treat a self-financed candidate differently than his opponent.
Congress may directly provide different funding to political parties based
on their public support, ability to raise money, and ability to win
elections.1 65 There is little difference and, in fact much less direct
interference, when Congress provides different contribution limits for a
candidate who chooses to raise funds and one who chooses to spend his
own personal wealth.166
Again, it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will rule on the
equal protection claim, as the analysis of differential treatment relied on
167
the accepted fact that public funding was a legitimate public purpose.
In the present case, if the Court finds no First Amendment harm because

159. See Davis, 501 F. Supp. at 33-34; Brief of Appellee, supranote 130, at 44-45.
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97-98 (1976). The Court noted:
[T]here are obvious differences in kind between the needs and potentials of a political
party with historically established broad support, on the one hand, and a new or small
political organization on the other ....
Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in
treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike ....
Id. (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 441-42 (1971)).
161. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 98.
162. Id. at 98-99.
163. Id. at 99.
164. Brief for Appellee, supranote 130, at 44-45.
165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 98.
166. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 130, at 45 ("There is no reason to regard Section 319's
differentials in the amounts of money that candidates may receive from private contributions as more
suspect than analogous differentials in the distribution of federal funds.").
167. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-96.
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raised contribution limits and coordinated party expenditures are not
inherently coercive, then the arguments of an equal protection violation
have little merit. 168 Further, if the government interests of leveling the
playing field or combating the effects of personal wealth on elections
are valid, then Congress is completely justified in treating the differences
169
in candidates' resources differently.
The Court may rule separately on the increased coordinated party
expenditures allowed for the self-financed candidate's opponent. 17 0
Specifically, Justice Kennedy raised serious concerns with allowing only
one candidate increased coordinated party expenditures while
withholding this advantage to a self-financed candidate.171
While
Congress may be justified in treating different candidates differently,
Justice Kennedy strenuously questioned a provision allowing one
candidate, simply by virtue of his opponent's spending, to have
additional support from his political party. 172 Specifically, Justice
Kennedy asked whether increased coordinated party expenditures for
one candidate allowed the candidate access to a different kind and quality
of speech than his self-financed opponent. 173 Regulating access to this
particularly potent kind of speech and party support for one candidate
174
substantially differs from regulating access to campaign funding.
Allowing raised contribution limits simply provides more money, which
is political speech, to one candidate relative to the personal funds
utilized by the opposing candidate and does not restrict or enhance
access to a different kind and quality of speech. 175 The Court may very
well sever this provision from the statute-at the very least-and
declare it unconstitutional because it regulates access to a kind of speech
176
based solely on campaign expenditures.

168. Brief of Appellee, supra note 130, at 45 (noting Davis argues an equal protection violation for
the same reasons as a First Amendment harm, thus if no First Amendment harm exists, there cannot be
an equal protection violation).
169. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-98.
170. See Davis v. FEC: Splitting the Baby?, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010673.html (Apr. 22,
2008, 12:38 EST).

171. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 17-20.
172. Id. at 17-20, 22, 28-30.
173. Id. at 28-29.

174. Cf id. at 28-29. Justice Kennedy said party support is a very different kind of speech providing
support to a candidate to win an election. Id.
175. See id. at20-21,28-29.
176. See
id.
at
48-49;
Davis
v.
FEC:
Splitting
the
Baby?,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010673.html (Apr. 22, 2008, 12:38 EST).
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V. CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the Millionaires' Amendment to the BCRA to
combat an old problem of excessive amounts of wealth in the hands of a
small minority of individuals buying seats in Congress and hindering less
affluent candidates from running.177 When determining the necessity of

combating corruption in the electoral process, the Supreme Court
traditionally defers to Congress to set what Congress determines are
appropriate contribution limits. 178 In Davis, the Supreme Court must
decide if Congress's determination to combat the corrosive effects of

immense wealth not tied to actual public support 179 sufficiently
discourages a candidate's

choice to self-finance

his campaign and

therefore violates the First Amendment.1 80 Traditionally, the courts
only found a First Amendment violation when a statute creates such a
large disparity between permissible funding sources that the statute
effectively coerces a candidate into one funding source.1 81
By its
construction, the Millionaires' Amendment allows a self-financed

candidate's opponent to receive contributions in excess of normal limits
but only up to a level of parity with the funds expended by the selffinanced candidate.1 82 Therefore, as there is no large disparity and the
candidate has the choice to self-fund, the Supreme Court cannot likely

rule the statute effectively coerces the candidate into receiving
contributions or takes away his choice to self-fund. 183 Instead, the
amendment actually works to enhance overall speech by loosening
1 84
restrictions on political speech and thereby raising contribution limits.
If the Supreme Court finds a First Amendment violation, it would have

to determine that the effect of an advantage for one candidate, which is
177. Brief of Appellee, supra note 130, at 6; see Steen, supra note 9, at 159-62; Hess, supranote 4, at
1067.
178. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 385-90 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1975).
179. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
180. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1; see Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008).
181. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp 2d 22, 31 (2007) (noting Buckley's reliance on the choice of a
candidate to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding created no constitutional dilemma,
and only when an advantage creates "a large disparity between benefits and restrictions that
candidates are coerced to publicly finance their campaigns" is there a constitutional burden) (quoting
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1550 (8th Cir. 1996)).
182. See Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
183. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976); Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
184. See Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (claiming the "Millionaires' Amendment accomplishes its
sponsors' aim to preserve core First Amendment values by protecting the candidate's ability to
enhance his participation in the political marketplace"); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85,
at 21 (noting a self-financed "candidate isn't subject to any restriction at all on what he can spend and
his opponent is subject to less restrictions. It seems to me the First Amendment comes out better.").
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purely dependent upon the self-financed candidate's choice, is enough to
chill political speech.
The Supreme Court may rule such harm exists mainly due to the lack
of a sufficient government interest to impose any chill on political
speech, even if the harm is only due to pure choice.18 5 If the Court rules
that government has no interest in leveling the playing field between
candidates to combat the effects of immense wealth, the Court would
essentially take away Congress's role to define corruption and limit such
a definition only to quid pro quo.186 In addition, the enhanced twentyfour hour disclosure requirements will likely rise or fall depending on the
constitutionality of the government's interest as necessary components
of the statue to implement this interest. 87
Finally, as the Supreme Court allows candidates and parties to be
treated differently based upon their resources and public support, Davis's
equal protection claim cannot stand on the argument that both parties
are candidates for a congressional seat. 88 Therefore, the Court would
have to find the differences in contribution limits are not justified by the
government interest, even though the candidates are situated differently
in their resources. The Court may find an equal protection violation
concerning one candidate's access to increased coordinated party
expenditures in response to a self-financed candidate's spending.18 9 The
Court appears to consider access to a kind and quality of speech
characterized by party coordination as inherently different from speech
allowed through increased money in response to money spent. 190
With so many issues to consider, the overall ruling may be
fragmented. The Court may allow Congress to ease restrictions on
contributions because little harm results due to the opponent's choice of
free speech, but may strike down some provisions concerning access to
party support. While little coercion exists, the Court may also continue
its swing towards the First Amendment and not allow any chill on free

185. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (stating any harm
done to First Amendment must be justified by compelling government interest narrowly tailored to
achieve that end).
186. See Dotan, supra note 3, at 997-98.
187. Brief of Appellee, supra note 130, at 48 ((quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67) (The information
"provides the electorate with information 'as to where political campaign money comes from' .. in
order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office") (internal citations omitted)).
188. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 97-98.
189. Davis v. FEC: Splitting the Baby?, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010673.html (Apr. 22,
2008, 12:38 EST).
190. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 85, at 48-50; Davis v. FEC: Splitting the Baby?,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010673.html (Apr. 22, 2008, 12:38 EST).
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speech, specifically without more of an interest than leveling the
playing field.191

191. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 1065.

